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Towards tax co-ordination 
in the European Union 
A package to tackle harmful tax competition INTRODUCTION 
1.  Following  the  informal  meeting  of ECOFIN  Ministers  in  Mondorf-les-Bains  on 
13  September 1997, the Council Presidency has announced its intention to hold an orientation 
debate on taxation in the formal meeting of 13 October.  At the invitation of the P-residency, 
the Commission is submitting this paper as a basis for discussion.  It builds on the discussions 
in  Mondorf-les-Bains and  in  the  Taxation Policy Group  by  outlining  a proposal  for  a tax 
package to curtail harmful tax competition including a code of conduct.  A draft for a code, as 
it  has  emerged  from  discussions  in  the  Taxation  Policy  Group,  is  annexed  to  this 
communication. 
2.  On the basis of  the global approach to taxation policy that was launched in April 1996 
at  the  informal  ECOFIN meeting  in  Verona,  the  package  seeks  to  develop a  co-ordinated 
approach to harmful tax competition.  There is a need for action at the European level in order 
to reduce distortions to the Single Market; to prevent significant losses of  tax revenue; and to 
reverse the trend of  an increasing tax burden on labour as compared to more mobile tax bases. 
Progress on the package would help to reverse this trend and so enable tax structures within 
the  Community  to  develop  in  a  more  employment-friendly  way.  The  special  European 
Council on Employment on 20-21 November will be  able to give particular attention to  the 
implications for employment of  trends in taxation systems.  The Commission's Guidelines for 
Employment which  will  be  discussed  at  the  Employment  Summit  in November will  also 
include recommendations on making taxation systems more employment friendly. 
A GREATER NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION 
3.  Tax  competition  in  itself is  generally  to  be  welcomed,  as  a  means  of benefiting 
citizens and of  imposing downward pressure on government spending.  However, unrestrained 
competition for mobile factors  can both bias  tax systems against employment and make an 
orderly and structured reduction in the overall tax burden more difficult.  It also reduces the 
room  for  manoeuvre  to  meet  other  Community  objectives,  such  as  the  protection  of the 
environment.  Furthermore,  tax  competition  can  hamper  efforts  to  reduce  budget  deficits, 
which is not only a necessary end in itself but is also needed in order to comply both with the 
Maastricht criteria and  witli  the Stability and  Growth  Pact.  Market integration, without any 
accompanying tax co-ordination, is putting increasing constraints on Member States' freedom 
to choose the appropriate tax structure, including by broadening the tax base and lowering the 
rates. 
2 4.  As was noted in Mondorf-les-Bains, trends over the last 15 years show an increasing 
tax burden on labour.  The implicit tax rate (that is, tax revenues divided by the appropriate 
base) on employed labour has increased by more than 7 percentage points, whereas the same 
rate for other factors of production (capital, self-employed labour, energy, natural resources) 
has  decreased  by  more than  10 percentage points  (figure 1).  Within  the  labour factor,  the 
burden  of taxation  is  shifting  to  the  least  skilled  and  less  mobile  employees,  while 
highly-skilled  employees  are  increasingly  mobile  and  responsive  to  tax  differentials. 
Furthermore, small firms and craft industries - which are so important for job creation - are 
penalised  compared  to  larger  enterprises  which  have  easier  access  to  the  opportunities 
provided by tax differentials and tax competition. 
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5.  Tax competition may be one important factor in this shift in the tax burden to the less 
mobile base of labour.  The high rate of mobility of certain bases may have forced Member 
States to  reduce  taxation on  such bases below the  levels that they consider desirable,  and 
necessitated  corresponding  increases  in  taxation  on  less  mobile  bases.  This  trend  in  tax 
structures should be  reversed.  A growing body of evidence now points to  a strong negative 
etlect of high  labour taxes on the level of employment and growth  in  Europe.  It  has  been 
estimated that several percentage points of the current rate of unemployment are due to  this 
increase in the taxation of labour.  · 
3 6.  While capital liberalisation is beneficial, the abolition of barriers to capital movement, 
together with exemptions from taxation, enhance opportunities to  avoid reporting revenues. 
Cross-frontier  fraud  affects  all  taxes,  including  consumption  taxes  although  these  are 
harmonised to a much greater extent than are direct taxes. 
7.  The contribution of tax policies to  Community objectives must increasingly be seen 
within  the  context  of the  developing  Single  Market.  The  Single  Market  and  EMU  are 
essential for growth and prosperity; however, they also increase the importance of taxation as 
a competitive factor.  As regulatory barriers in the Single Market are dismantled, taxation is 
increasingly  identifiable· as  a  key  factor  influencing  economic  decisions.  And  as  the 
introduction of the  single  currency  eliminates  exchange  rate  risks  and  reduces  transaction 
costs, the differences between national tax systems will become more visible and will have an 
even greater influence on decisions on the allocation of  capital, and therefore the efficiency of 
those decisions. 
8.  Achieving  a properly  functioning  Single  Market remains  an  overriding  priority  for 
Community action in the field of taxation.  There is, however, also an urgent need to consider 
how taxation policies can contribute to job creation in Europe at a time when the fight against 
unemployment is the Union's key priority.  · 
9.  Within the framework of European models of a social market economy, views may 
differ as to the emphasis to be given to the "social" and "market" elements.  Unless there is 
some  tax  co-ordination  there  will  be  increasing  threats:  both  with  regard  to  the  social 
dimension,  because  of the  redistributive  effect  of the  increasing  taxation  of labour,  in 
particular of less-skilled labour; and with regard to the market element, because of the effect 
of  tax distortions to the Single Market. 
10.  It  is  also  clear  that  tax  policies  must  take  account  of  the  Union's  global 
competitiveness  and  of international  obligations  under  World  Trade  Organisation  rules. 
Globalisation and vastly expanded trade and capital flows  magnify the risks of harmful tax 
competition.  At the same time, technolo'gical innovation and the development of electronic 
commerce  enhance the  mobility  of certain  forms  of economic  activity,  particularly  in  the 
services  sector  and  in  the  movement  of capital,  and  may  increase  the  impact  of tax 
differentials on business decisions. 
11.  In  this  changing  environment,  harmful  tax  competition  will  become  an  increasing 
source of conflict among Member States unless greater co-ordination can be achieved within 
the EU.  This co-ordination should in principle be achieved at a world-wide level and, indeed, 
the OECD and G7 are currently considering the issue.  However, the chances of a satisfactory 
solution being reached at  the OECD  will  be  greatly improved if EU  Member States act  in  a 
more  co-ordinated  way.  And  the  closer  degree  of economic  integration,  EMU,  and  the 
existence of Community  rules  on  competition  and  state aids  create  a  fundamental  need  to 
ensure hetter co-operation ~ithin the Union. 
4 A IP' ACKAGJE 1'0 1I'  AC.IKJLJE lHIARMFUL 1I'  AX COMPJE'Jl'1[1fli0N 
12.  The  informal meeting  in  Mondorf-les-Bains  considered  how best to  respond  to  the 
.  need for progress and greater co-ordination.  As a result, the Commission has been invited to 
present the outline of a tax package which would enable progress to be made in parallel on a 
number of fronts.  The  Commission  is  making  these  proposals  having  full  regard  to  the 
principle of subsidiarity and to the particular difficulties posed in the area of taxation by the 
requirement  for  unanimity  between  Member  States.  These  considerations  mean  that  any 
package that is  proposed must balance as  far  as  possible the  interests of different Member 
States.  This implies a spirit of openness and compromise.  In the light of the discussions in 
Mondorf-les-Bains  and  of the  Taxation  Policy  Group  meeting  on  18 September,  this 
communication therefore sets out possible components  for  such a package  on the  basis of 
which  a political  agreement  may  be  reached  by  the  end  of the  year,  as  indicated  by  the 
Presidency. 
13.  The possible components ofthe package are the following: 
o  a code of conduct for business taxation and in parallel a Commission communication on . 
fiscal state aids; 
o  measures to eliminate distortions to the taxation of  capital income; 
o  measures  to  eliminate  withholding taxes  on  cross-border  interest  and  royalty  payments 
between companies; and 
o  measures designed to eliminate significant distortions in the area of  indirect taxation. 
Each of  these components is described below. 
14.  A code of conduct for  business taxation will be  a key element of the package.  This 
will help to prevent economic distortions and an erosion of tax bases within the Community. 
It will take the  form  of a non  legally-binding  instrument that engages  Member States at a 
political level to respect principles of fair competition, and to refrain from  tax measures that 
are  harmful.  The  code would  incorporate a review and  monitoring  process,  and  would  be 
capable of later development and  refinement in the light of experience. This will also help to 
evaluate the need for other instruments in the field of business taxation. 
5 15.  Following the informal discussions in Mondorf-les-Bains, which no_ted the substantial 
progress that had been made on this issue, the Presidency invited the Commission to provide 
the Council with a text for the code of the conduct. The draft code annexed to this paper has 
been developed through the intensive and constructive work of the Taxation Policy Group in 
its four meetings so far this year, most recently at its meeting of 18 September.  Although this 
text  is  put  forward  in  its  own  name,  the  Commission  would  like  to  acknowledge  the 
considerable debt that it owes to co-operative efforts of  the Member States in that Group. 
16.  There is a wide degree of support for the approach suggested by the Commission, and 
for a code to be adopted in the form of a non legally binding instrument. However, if  the code 
is to perform its role in effectively tackling harmful tax competition, it needs to be supported 
by a strong political commitment from the Member States. That commitment could be made 
in a Council resolution endorsing the  code submitted to  it by  the  Commission.  In  order to• 
allow for  an  agreement  on the  code  at  the  December ECOFIN  Council,  the  Commission 
invites Ministers to  give clear orientations on the  draft at the  13  October meeting;  further 
technical  work could,  if necessary,  be  undertaken  by  the Commission through  appropriate 
contacts with Member States in the run-up to the December meeting. 
17.  As a matching commitment to the political agreement of Member States to the code, 
many Member States have urged the Commission to re-examine its policy in the field of  fiscal 
state aid and to make full  use of its powers under the Treaty rules, in order to help combat 
harmful  tax  competition~  As  announced  in  the  Action  Plan  for  the  Single  Market,  the 
Commission will continue vigorously to apply the state aid rules, including for fiscal aids.  In 
the tax area, it will, in considering the common interest, take into account negative effects of 
aid that are brought to light by the Taxation Policy Group.  In accordance with the Treaty, the 
Commission will, in co-operation with Member States, review its past decisions and may, if 
necessary, propose that Member States amend or abolish aid as required by the development 
or the functioning of the Single Market.  In addition, the Commission will respond positively 
and associate itself with the commitment entered into by the Member States in the code of 
conduct, notably by presenting separately and under its own initiative a communication that 
clarifies and refines its policy on the application of  the state aid rules to fiscal measures in the 
light of  developments in the Single Market.  In this way the Commission intends to make this 
policy as transparent as possible, so ensuring that its decisions are predictable and that equal 
treatment is guaranteed. 
6 1'axatitm of  capi/l(JJl income 
18.  Capital income is the most mobile tax base of alL  Action at the Community level is 
needed  in order  to  counter current and  potential  distortions  to  the  Single  Market,  and  to 
prevent significant losses of tax revenue.  The Council recognised these risks at the time of 
discussions on the 1988 Directive on the Liberalisation of Capital Movements, giving rise to 
the  Commission's  1989 proposal for the taxation of income from  individual  savings.  The 
adoption of  the Euro will soon remove one remaining disincentive to cross-border investment, 
so increasing still further the need for action. 
19.  There is a clear call from all sides for renewed action on the taxation of income from 
savings.  However,  progress  in  this  difficult  and  sensitive  area  will  require  a  spirit  of 
ncompromise.  The Commission therefore proposes an evolutionary approach.  As a first step, 
it  calls  upon  Member  States  to  make  a  political  commitment  in  the  December  ECOFIN 
meeting based on a number of agreed  key  principles,  coupled with a commitment to  enter 
swiftly into constructive discussions on a proposal which would be based on these principles. 
The  Commission  for  its  part  undertakes  to  come  forward  with  such  a  proposal  at  an 
appropriate time.  The principles to which Member States could be invited to subscribe would 
be based on the following elements: 
I.  A common solution is  needed in order to prevent undesirable distortions. A minimum 
solution in the form of  a directive is preferable to the current situation, which can lead to 
non-taxation. 
II.  That solution should be limited to interest paid in a Member State to individuals who are 
not resident for tax purposes in that State but who are resident in another Member State. 
III.  As a first step, Member States should accept the so-called "co-existence model" in order 
to  ensure  at  least  some  degree  of effective  taxation  of non-residents'  income  from 
savings within the Community. Every Member State should either operate a minimum 
withholding tax or provide information on savings income to other Member States. (This 
would not, however, prevent a Member State from having both systems). 
IV.  All arrangements should take into.account the need to preserve the competitiveness of 
European financial markets in a global context. The Community should also promote an 
extension of  the agreed solution beyond its borders. 
V.  Withholding tax on interest payments made to residents of other Member States should, 
in  principle, be levied by  the paying agent.  Although some refinement of this principle 
might be necessary, this rule would allow easier identification of the  beneficiaries.  The 
arrangements  for  checking  the  liscal  residence  of beneficiaries  should  not  he  too 
cumbersome, again in order to maintain global competitiveness. 
7 VI.  'Where a Member State does not use the exchange of information option, it should apply 
the  withholding  tax  at  least  at  a  minimum  level.  This  minimum  tax  rate  should  be 
specified  at  a  level  which  is  sufficient  to  ensure  an  acceptable  level  of taxation  of 
crossborder savings. 
Interest and royalties 
20.  As  noted in the Action Plan for the Single Market, withholding taxes on interest and 
royalty  payments between companies create difficulties  for  economic  operators engaged  in 
cross-border  business.  They  can  involve  time-consuming  formalities,  result  in  cash  flow 
losses,  and  sometimes  lead to  double  taxation.  Priority should therefore  be  given to  their 
elimination.  In the light of the discussions at the informal meeting in Mondorf-les-Bains and 
in the Taxation Policy Group,  the Commission believes that the  elimination of withholding 
taxes on interest and royalty payments between companies should form part of the taxation 
package. As part of the package, Member States could make a political commitment to work 
towards the early adoption of  a directive for which the Commission will make a new proposal. 
Indirect tax elements 
21-.  The Commission is fully aware that a number of Member States are not convinced of 
the  usefulness  of including  indirect  taxation  measures  in  the  package.  However,  some 
Member States have  equally stressed the need for  some  parallel action in  indirect taxation 
areas if the approach to the resolution of taxation problems in the EU is to be a balanced one. 
Harmful  tax  competition  between  Member  States  in  the  VAT  area  is  possible  insofar  as 
divergences in the application of the current transitional VAT system impact on transnational 
economic activities or on activities in a neighbouring Member State.  Operators can exploit 
these divergences by using clever "tax engineering".  The large disparities between Member 
States in the tax treatment of energy products also create tax distortions and curtail Member · 
States'  freedom of action in  taxation policy.  The  Commission puts  forward  the  following 
proposals  for  consideration  firstly  because  they  will  in  their  own  right  contribute  to  the 
elimination of tax distortions and secondly because they can contribute towards balancing the 
package.  At the same time the Commission is flexible as regards those measures and leaves it 
to  the Council to determine whether this broad approach is  a useful method of achieving a 
compromise.  If the Council agrees, principles could be elaborated for discussion at the next 
meeting of the Taxation Policy Group, with a view to  allowing a political engagement to  be 
made by the end of  the year. 
I.  VAT Committee.  The  Commission proposes that the alteration already  proposed  to  the 
status  of  the  VAT  Committee,  making  it  a  regulatory  committee  assisting  the 
Commission in adopting implementation measures of  the 6th VAT directive, could, in so 
far as situations of double taxation or non-taxation will be dealt with according to  this 
new procedure, be part of  the package. 
8 II.  Taxation of  investment gold.  A solution to the problem of distortions in the gold trade 
in  the  Community,  caused  by  the  great  divergence  in  VAT  treatment  of  gold 
transactions  across  the  Community,  could  be  found  by  providing  for  an exemption 
from  VAT  for  transactions  in  gold  for  investment  purposes,  and  taxation  of other 
gold, especially of that used for industrial purposes. 
III.  Passenger transport.  This has also been mentioned by some Member States as an area 
of  concern. 
IV.  Taxation of  energy products. A political agreement between Member States could allow 
the application of certain elements of the existing draft directive (COM (97) 30 final). 
This could involve agreement on revisions to  existing minimum levels of taxation for 
mineral oils and the introduction of minimum levels of taxation  for  energy products 
other than mineral oils. It could equally encompass the derogations provided for in the 
draft directive, for example for natural gas in the case of  emerging markets. 
V.  FISCALIS.  The Commission proposes that agreement be reached on the establishment 
of the FISCALIS programme of co-operation between the Member States against fraud 
in the indirect taxation area. 
W  A 1! lFOJRW  AIRD ANID <CONCJLl!J§llON 
22.  There is clearly a pressing need to make progress in the field of  taxation and to ensure 
a more effective co-ordination of  taxation policies, both in the light of  the development of  the 
Single Market and of the need to reduce the level of unemployment within the Community. 
Tackling the issue of  harmful tax competition, which threatens both to reduce revenues and to 
distort  taxation structures,  should  be  central  to  this  process.  Within this  context,  and  as 
requested by the Council Presidency, the code of conduct is being put forward, together with 
other elements to form a taxation package, in order to facilitate reaching political agreement at 
the  ECOFIN  meeting  on  1 December.  The  Commission  believes  that  such  a  political 
agreement will be a crucial first step in the evolving process of  co-ordination. 
23.  Finance Ministers are therefore requested 
o  to  confirm  the  scope  of the  taxation  package  to  tackle  harmful  tax  competition  that 
should go forward for a political agreement before the end of this year; 
o  to  endorse the  draft code of conduct  that  is  attached  to  this  paper with  a  view  to  its 
adoption in December 1997; 
9 Q  to give a first reaction to the principles put forward for a minimum solution on the taxation 
of  savings; and 
o  to instruct their personal representatives in the Taxation Policy Group to continue to work 
·constructively  in  order  to  enable  the  Commission  to  develop  all  the  elements  of the 
taxation package to  be  submitted to  the  ECOFIN  Council  for  a political  agreement  in 
December. 
10 ANNEX 
DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT FOR BUSINJESS TAXATION 
Political Commitment 
A.  While  recognising  the  positive effects  of fair  competition,  and  the  need  to  maintain 
world-wide  competitiveness,  the  Council  notes  that unrestrained  tax  competition for 
mobile forms  of business  increasingly  threatens  to  cause economic distortions and to 
erode tax bases within the Community. It underlines its concern in this area, especially 
in  relation  to  measures  that  provide  operating  support  to  international  finance  and 
services  activities.  The  Council  condemns  the  use  of tax ·measures  that  harm  the 
Community  interest,  including  the  effective  operation of the  Single  Market,  and  it 
accordingly  encourages  Member  States  neither  to  introduce  nor  to  retain  such 
measures. 
- B.  To  this  end,  it  requests  the  Member  States  to  adopt  and  implement  the  following 
principles  and  rules  of behaviour.  These  rules,  which  fully  respect  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity, are· wholly  without prejudice to the application of Community law.  They 
identify  tax  measures  that  are  potentially  harmful;  and  provide  a  framework  within 
which  Member  States  can  commit  themselves  to  follow  the  principles  of  fair 
competition. 
Scope 
C.  This code covers those business  tax measures  which affect,  or which may  affect,  the 
location of business activity in the Community in a significant way. Business activity in 
this respect includes  all  activities carried out within a group  of companies.  The code 
also covers those special tax regimes for employees which have a similar effect on the 
location of business activity.  The tax measures covered by the code include legislative 
provisions, regulations and administrative practices. 
D.  Within this field of application,  the  Council recognises certain types of tax measure as 
potentially  harmful.  These  hav~ one  or  more  of the  characteristics  described  in  §E 
below. Although not every measure that is  indicated in that paragraph will be  harmful, 
each of the characteristics merits consideration. 
11 E.  The Council recognises as  being potentially harmful those tax measures which provide 
for  a significantly lower effective  level  of taxation,. including zero taxation,  than that 
which generally applies in the country in question.  Such regimes may operate by virtue 
of the nominal tax rate, by virtue of the tax base, or otherwise. These measures should 
further be evaluated in the light of whether: 
(i)  particular benefits  are  given only  to  non-residents  of the country  in question;  or 
they are given only in respect of transactions carried out with non-residents; 
(ii)  benefits  are  otherwise  ring-fenced  from  the  domestic  economy  so  they  do  not 
affect the national tax base; 
(iii)  benefits are available without there being ~my real economic activity; 
(iv)  the  basis. of profit  determination  in  respect  of activities  within  a  multinational 
group of companies departs from  internationally-accepted rules,  notably  those  agreed 
upon within the OECD; 
(v)  the  measure  lacks  transparency,  including  where  benefits  are  given by  relaxing 
statutory rules at administrative level in a way that is not public. 
Provision and review of  information 
F.  In accordance  with  the  principles  of transparency  and  openness,  Member States  will 
inform each other of their existing  and  proposed. tax  measures  which  fall  within  the 
scope of the  code as  described at  §C-E above.  In addition,  Member States  may  seek 
information from other Member States on any tax measure which appears potentially to 
fall  within the  scope  of those  paragraphs.  The  Council  requests 'the  Commission,  to 
which  Member States  will  also  provide  this  information,  to  co-ordinate  its  exchange 
between the Member States. 
G.  Member States will, moreover, have the opportunity to discuss and comment on the tax 
measures  of other Member States  within the  framework of a follow-up  Group,  which 
. will be open to all Member States.  This review will enable consideration to be given to 
the effects that these measures may have within the Community. Such a process, which 
should take into account the  factors  identified at  §E above,  will enable Member States 
to  make  a  better  evaluation  of whether  particular  tax  measures  are  harmful.  The 
Council requests the Commission to carry out the preparatory work for the meetings of 
the Group, which will take place as  necessary, and to oversee the exchange and. review 
process. The Group will transmit a report of the review of each measure to the Council 
for its consideration and,  if it deems appropriate, for publication. 
H.  The  Council  emphasises  the  need  to  assess  carefully  the  effects  which  tax  measures 
have on other Member States;  and,  in so  far as  they are used  to  support the economic 
development  of particular  areas,  to  evaluate ·the  extent  to ·which  the  measures  are 
. etl"ective. in achieving their aims. 
12 Standstill 
I.  Member  States  will  respect  the  principles  outlined  above  when  determining  their 
policy, and should have regard to the  ~eview process in assessing whether any  new tax 
measures or practices are harmful.  The Council accordingly calls  on them,  as  part of 
the  code  of conduct,  not  to  introduce  new  tax  measures  which  are  harmful  to  the 
Community interest, including the effective operation of the Single Market. 
Rollback 
J.  Member States  will  also  review  their existing  laws  and  established  practices,  having 
regard to the principles outlined above and to the review process. The Council calls on 
them to  amend such laws  and  practices as  necessary,  with a view  to  eliminating  any 
harmful measures within [a determined period that is  precisely defined but also allows 
for the reasonable expectations of business]. 
Anti-avoidance and tax evasion 
K.  The  Council  stresses  its  commitment  to  full  co-operation  in  the  fight  against  tax 
evasion and avoidance, notably in the provision of information to other Member States 
in accordance with national legislation. 
L.  The Council notes that anti-abuse provisions or countermeasures contained in tax laws 
and  in  double  taxation  conventions  play  a  fundamental  role  in  counteracting  tax 
avoidance and evasion. Member States should apply such measures in accordance with 
Community law. 
State aids 
M.  The  Council  notes  that  some,  although  not  all,  of the  tax  measures  covered  by  this 
code  fall  within  the  scope  of the  provisions  on  state  aid  in  Articles  92-94  of the 
EC Treaty.  It further  notes  that  the  implementation  of the  code  should  in  practice 
reduce the  need  for  Community intervention under the  state aid  rules  in  the  tax  field. 
Without prejudice to  Community law,  it requests the Commission to  provide guidance 
on  the  application  of the  state  aid  rules  to  fiscal  aids  and  to  commit  itself to  their 
rigorous application, taking into account negative effects of aid that are brought to light 
in the· application of this code. 
13 Geographical extension 
N.  The  provisions  of  this  code  should  apply  within  the  Community,  as  defined  in 
Article 227  of the  EC Treaty.  Furthermore,  the  Council  considers  that  it  would  be 
beneficia]  if the  principles  supporting  fair  competition  were  adopted  as  widely  as 
possible.  To this  end it encourages  Member States  to  stimulate  their  adoption at  an 
international level,  and  in  particular to  give  active  support  to  their adoption  in  their 
dependent or associated territories. 
Follow Up 
0.  In  order  to  help  to  ensure  the  even  and  effective  implementation  of the  code,  the 
Council invites the Commission,  acting in the capacity as  described in  §F-H above,  to 
report to it annually. · 
Revision clause 
P.  The Council  sh~ll review the provisions of this code when it has been in operation for 
two  years.  It will  at  that  stage  consider  whether  the  provisions  of  §E  should  be 
extended to  include a Member State's general business  tax  regime  where the  level  of 
taxation is significantly lower than the Community average. 
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